“Under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and, hence, positive inflation.”
— Ben Bernanke, 2002
Now we may find out if Mr. Bernanke was right. Japan appears to be ready to do whatever it takes to end its long run of falling prices. The Bank of Japan took limited action on Thursday, and more is expected in the new year.
Mr. Bernanke, then a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and now its chairman, gave the speech quoted above at a time when the American economy was stumbling along in a slow recovery and prices, at least as measured by the Consumer Price Index, were declining.
He was arguing that the Fed would not be out of ammunition if it cut nominal interest rates to zero and the economy failed to respond. He has since proved he was right about that. In the speech, he made a passing reference to a phrase used by Milton Friedman, about using a “helicopter drop” of money to fight inflation, which eventually earned him the nickname “Helicopter Ben” from conservatives scandalized by his aggressive action after the financial crisis began.
For two decades, Japan has provided stark evidence that chronic deflation is possible in a modern economy. Prices have fallen steadily despite extraordinarily low interest rates. The economy has stagnated.
This week the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled Japan for nearly its entire postwar history until it was swept from power three years ago, won a landslide victory. Shinzo Abe, the prime minister from 2006 to 2007, will get another chance.
Mr. Abe devoted a decent part of his campaign to criticism of the Bank of Japan, the country’s central bank. He wants the bank to pursue inflation, and to effectively print money until it gets it. At one point during the campaign he spoke of a 3 percent inflation target, although he seems to have cut that back to 2 percent.
Either goal, if realized, would be a major change for the country. The inflation index used in calculations of gross domestic product is now 18 percent lower than it was at the end of 1994.
On Thursday, the central bank took a relatively small step in the direction favored by Mr. Abe. It decided to step up its asset purchases and seemed to leave open the possibility that it would adopt the inflation target at a later meeting. Mr. Abe praised the move.
To a significant extent, deflationary expectations are now baked into the Japanese economy. Tiny government bond yields have persisted for many years. Even though the nominal yields are small, the real (after inflation) yields have been respectable because there has been deflation, not inflation. And the competition has not been that great. The stock market has fluctuated, but it remains far below where it was when the Japanese bubble began to deflate in the early 1990s. Real estate losses from that bubble — do you remember when the gardens of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo were supposed to be worth more than the entire state of California? — still have an impact on investor psychology.
Western economists, Mr. Bernanke among them, have long called for Japan to target inflation. Lately, some Chinese economists have been offering similar lectures. But until now, little has happened. The central bank has announced a goal of positive inflation of up to 1 percent, but it is not widely believed, and it has certainly not happened.
As it is, the limited quantitative easing efforts of the Japanese central bank have been viewed as temporary, and as not really changing anything. Whether the new promises of something more significant will be credible remains to be seen.
“At this point, moving to a 2 percent target would not be such a giant step,” said Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard economist who has suggested inflation targeting in the United States as well as in Japan. “They have to pursue it vigorously until we have inflation expectations firmly higher. No one knows how much they would have to do to accomplish that.”
The Bank of Japan has in the past been hesitant to really try to establish that credibility, for at least two reasons. One is that there is fear that the Japanese government bond market would be disrupted. Another is that it could do severe damage to the central bank’s own balance sheet. It owns a lot of Japanese government bonds whose market value would fall. Conceivably, that could cause the bank to seek a recapitalization from the government, something that would be embarrassing, to say the least.
To establish the credibility, the central bank would have to show a readiness to create credit at a rapid rate. It would probably also need to take steps to hold down the value of the yen, a move that would no doubt cause concern in the United States.
It is, however, very doable, as Switzerland has shown. When the euro zone debt crisis was at its worst, Switzerland became a safe haven for European investors worried that the euro might blow up. That drove up the value of the Swiss franc versus the euro and damaged Switzerland’s ability to compete. The Swiss government responded by announcing that the euro would not be allowed to fall below 1.2 Swiss francs. If necessary, the government would simply sell francs to meet any demand.
That has been necessary, and the Swiss have accumulated a huge portfolio of foreign currency. So, too, could the Japanese if they chose to announce that the dollar would henceforth be worth at least 100 yen, a level not seen since 2009.
Doing so would instantly restore at least some competitiveness to Japanese industry, which has experienced something that would have seemed impossible only a few years ago: Japan has a trade deficit.
Bringing inflation to Japan could make the country’s debt load — now higher than that of any other major country — appear more manageable. One unfortunate result of deflation coupled with perennial recession is that a country’s debt-to-G.D.P. ratio rises even if no more money is borrowed. Measured in yen, the Japanese economy was larger when Mr. Abe left office in 2007 — two years before his party lost power — than it is now.
A stronger recovery in the United States, not to mention avoiding a new Europe-wide downturn, would make it easier for Japan to begin to grow again. But even if that did happen, it would not solve all of Japan’s problems. The country has an aging, shrinking population. It needs more workers, but the Japanese attitude toward immigration makes Arizona look liberal by comparison.
Japan’s economy has been adrift for so long that much of the world takes for granted that it cannot, or at least will not, ever be reformed. Such cynicism has a basis, but it is possible that circumstances have changed. Japanese who seemed content with the way things were now clearly want something different, even if they are not sure what, or how to get it.
Three years ago, the Democratic Party of Japan won a landslide election, only to prove stumbling and incoherent when it tried to govern. Now the voters have turned back to the Liberal Democrats. Whether Mr. Abe will be more competent, and whether he will be able to effectively lead a party that still has competing factions, is far from clear.
Still, investors are taking heart. Japanese stocks leapt on the news of the election results, while the yen weakened. For now, at least, there is reason to hope that something important was changed by this election.
